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S E C R E T

15 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

[redacted]  
Chairman, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures  
Subcommittee

25X1

SUBJECT: Comments on NSA's Terms of Reference (TOR) for the  
Countermeasures Advisory Panel (CAP)

1. This memorandum addresses my concerns with what appears to be not only duplication of effort but also a source of confusion within the U.S. Government on where the responsibility lies for decisions involving Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) and physical security matters. This could, at a minimum, lead to the divulgence of information outside appropriate channels by having more than one U.S. Government committee considering matters pertaining to the same technical discipline. The responses below are keyed to the various sections of the TOR document.

• Covering Memo and General Section of TOR (PARA 1)

25X1 [redacted] mentions the establishment of a superior technical base. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS) has already established a mechanism to task collectors with targeting on hostile technical surveillance efforts and information on capabilities. We also have a data base and distribution system with an approval mechanism for passing information to both the private sector and foreign governments when it is beneficial to the U.S. Government. Through both the TSCS and the R&D Subcommittee, the Intelligence Community (IC) fosters joint R&D and equipment purchase efforts as well as ensuring commonality of training through the Interagency Training Center (ITC). Testing is done for the IC at two facilities with information passed to all members, other government agencies and contractors where appropriate.

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED

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● TOR - PURPOSE (PARA 3)

- a. As stated above, the TSCS, R&D Subcommittee and the Physical Security Working Group under SECOM already provide a forum for the IC and other government agencies for examining vulnerabilities in the TSCM and Physical Security arenas. This includes methods, standards, procedures and training.
- b. The above organizations also advise and assist appropriate program managers on issues relating to the formulation and implementation of national policy, standards and procedures where required.
- c. The same SECOM elements provide liaison with all U.S. Government organizations, non-government organizations [redacted] on issues concerning technical security countermeasures. In addition the TSCS is already set up to do this and has been doing it for years, with excellent results. This includes export control oversight for the IC on TSCM equipment.
- f. The TSCS and the R&D Subcommittee maintain a working forum for TSCM and physical security hardware for the IC, including membership on GSA's Interagency Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE). This includes R&D and lab testing facilities for both equipment and "FINDS".
- g. TSCS oversees the ITC for all U.S. Government TSCM training but more specifically for the IC.
- hi&j The Security Committee sponsors and oversees various seminars and training courses to promote awareness in all security areas including education and training.

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In summary of the above, it can safely be said that SECOM already provides for the same services that the CAP, TOR proposes to establish in the areas of TSCM and Physical Security. It is not wise to have two disparate groups involved in the same areas and doing things that may be at odds with each other. The spokesman already exists.

Paragraph 4 would appear to be contradictory to all that goes on before in the TOR. They have gone to great extremes to involve themselves in TSCM and physical security areas where there is already a cognizant authority for the IC (the largest user of these services).



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